\nPart 1<\/a> |\u00a0Part 2<\/a>\u00a0|\u00a0Part 3<\/a>\u00a0|\u00a0
![\"Air](\"https:\/\/www.gettysburgflag.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/08\/AirNatGuardSm-300x180.jpg\")
<\/a><\/h4>\nA vast gulf separated the conclusions of Air Force and Air Guard leaders about the lessons of the Berlin mobilization. The former failed to recognize immediately the constraints which obsolescent aircraft, inadequate funding and incomplete manning as well as poor planning had placed on the Air Guard’s development. Many of them still viewed the Air Guard as amateurs who had not improved significantly since the Korean War. But, the Berlin mobilization stimulated the Air Force<\/a> to\u00a0make significant improvements in the air reserve components.<\/p>\nThose changes\u00a0were reflected in Air Force Regulation 45-60, published in February 1963.<\/p>\n
It shifted the objectives of its reserve programs away from providing mobilization-day\u00a0units and individuals that required extensive post call-up preparations\u00a0before they were ready for combat. Instead, the new goal was “to provide operationally ready units and trained individuals that are immediately ready to augment the active duty establishment. ”<\/p>\n
Driven by the Kennedy administration’s adoption of the “flexible response” strategy\u00a0and the large American military buildup during the 1960s, the Air Guard\u00a0continued to modernize and diversify its aircraft inventory. It had entered\u00a0the tanker business in FY 1962 with the acquisition of KC-97s. In 1963,\u00a0Air Guard tactical flying units began to routinely deploy outside the continental\u00a0United States on their annual active duty training tours for the first\u00a0time. The ANG’s total aircraft inventory shrank from 2,269 in 1960 to 1,425\u00a0by 1965.<\/p>\n
Following the end of active American military involvement in the\u00a0Vietnam War in 1973, there was a substantial reduction in the active duty\u00a0Air Force enabling the ANG to acquire another infusion of modern aircraft\u00a0and equipment. These included A-7s, A-10As, F-105s, OA-37s and some brand\u00a0new C-130Hs. But, its principal fighter aircraft such as F-4s had logged\u00a0many flying hours including combat operations in Vietnam before they came\u00a0to the Guard.<\/p>\n
The Air Guard’s personnel strength stood at over 90,300 by\u00a0the end of FY 1973 when active American military involvement in the Vietnam\u00a0War ended.<\/p>\n
The Vietnam War illustrated a central paradox facing the USAF’s reserve components. In January 1968, President Johnson mobilized naval and air reservists following the North Korean seizure of the USS Pueblo. More reservists were called into federal service following the February 1968 Tet offensive in Vietnam. Altogether, approximately 10,600 Air Guardsmen were called into federal service in 1968. Although most of the reservists were used to strengthen America’s depleted strategic reserve force, four ANG fighter squadrons were dispatched to Vietnam.<\/p>\n
On 3 May, F-100s from the 120th Tactical Fighter Squadron (Colorado) arrived at Phan Rang Air Base. By 1 June, all of the 120th’s pilots were flying combat missions.<\/p>\n
In the meantime, the 174th (Iowa), 188th (New Mexico), and the 136th (New York) had all deployed to Vietnam with their F-100s. In addition, 85 percent of the 355th Tactical Fighter Squadron — on paper a regular Air Force unit — were Air Guardsmen. They performed superbly according to Gen George S. Brown, the Air Force Commander in Vietnam. But, two ANG units deployed to South Korea in 1968 — the 166th (Ohio) and the 127th (Kansas) — had a spotty record.<\/p>\n
Their own support organizations had been stripped from them in the U.S. and there was no logistical structure in place to support their F-100s when they arrived in South Korea. The wing’s readiness rate fell below Air Force minimum’s in December 1968. The wing lost four aircraft and had one pilot killed in early 1969. It also failed an operational readiness inspection (ORI).<\/p>\n
In the meantime, the Air Force had\u00a0belatedly rediscovered that the F-100C was poorly-suited to its announced\u00a0air defense mission. The 354th’s mission was then shifted to supporting\u00a0the ground forces in Korea. Once the Pueblo’s crew was returned, the Air\u00a0Guardsmen prepared to return home from Korea. The unit passed an ORI and\u00a0both of its fighter squadrons were rated combat-ready. They returned to\u00a0the United States and left federal service in May and June of 1969.<\/p>\n
The\u00a0123rd TRW also experienced a rocky tour of active duty. The wing had not\u00a0been rated combat-ready when mobilized on 26 January 1968 primarily due\u00a0to equipment shortages. It was not part of Secretary McNamara’s selected\u00a0reserve force. The unit was given an unsatisfactory ORI rating in October\u00a01968. Despite those problems, the 123rd made a significant contribution\u00a0to active force operations. It began functioning as the primary Air Force\u00a0tactical reconnaissance unit in the continental U.S.<\/p>\n
Elements of its squadrons\u00a0rotated temporary duty assignments in Japan and Korea from July 1968 until\u00a0April 1969 providing photo reconnaissance support to American forces in\u00a0those areas. The wing’s units were returned to state status between December\u00a01968 and June 1969.<\/p>\n
Vietnam revealed a negative aspect of relying on reservists.\u00a0For largely domestic political reasons, President Johnson chose not to\u00a0mobilize most of the nation’s reserve forces. The 1968 callups were only\u00a0token affairs. Johnson’s decision to avoid a major reserve mobilization\u00a0was opposed by the senior leadership of both the active duty military establishment\u00a0and the reserve forces, but to no avail. The Reserves and the Guard acquired\u00a0reputations as draft havens for relatively affluent young white men.<\/p>\n
Military\u00a0leaders questioned the wisdom of depending on reserve forces that might\u00a0not be available except in dire emergencies.<\/p>\n
Race had emerged as another\u00a0major issue with flowering of the American civil rights movement in the\u00a01950s and 1960s. For over a decade after the active duty military establishment\u00a0had begun to integrate its ranks during the Korean War, the National Guard<\/a> had remained an almost exclusively white organization. Discrimination varied, but ten states with large black populations and understaffed Guard units still had no black Guardsmen in their ranks as late as 1961.<\/p>\nSecretary of Defense McNamara had tried to encourage voluntary integration in the early 1960s, with little success. The NGB had disputed his legal authority to force integration while the Guard was under state control. It had also argued that integration would be political suicide for some governors and would hurt the military capabilities of their units. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibited the use of federal funds to support discriminatory activities, dramatically altered the attitude of the Defense Department toward racial discrimination in the National Guard. It gave federal officials the power to force integration regardless of who controlled the Guard in peacetime. But, real progress in effectively integrating the Guard did not come until the 1970s.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Those changes\u00a0were reflected in Air Force Regulation 45-60, published in February 1963.<\/p>\n
It shifted the objectives of its reserve programs away from providing mobilization-day\u00a0units and individuals that required extensive post call-up preparations\u00a0before they were ready for combat. Instead, the new goal was “to provide operationally ready units and trained individuals that are immediately ready to augment the active duty establishment. ”<\/p>\n
Driven by the Kennedy administration’s adoption of the “flexible response” strategy\u00a0and the large American military buildup during the 1960s, the Air Guard\u00a0continued to modernize and diversify its aircraft inventory. It had entered\u00a0the tanker business in FY 1962 with the acquisition of KC-97s. In 1963,\u00a0Air Guard tactical flying units began to routinely deploy outside the continental\u00a0United States on their annual active duty training tours for the first\u00a0time. The ANG’s total aircraft inventory shrank from 2,269 in 1960 to 1,425\u00a0by 1965.<\/p>\n
Following the end of active American military involvement in the\u00a0Vietnam War in 1973, there was a substantial reduction in the active duty\u00a0Air Force enabling the ANG to acquire another infusion of modern aircraft\u00a0and equipment. These included A-7s, A-10As, F-105s, OA-37s and some brand\u00a0new C-130Hs. But, its principal fighter aircraft such as F-4s had logged\u00a0many flying hours including combat operations in Vietnam before they came\u00a0to the Guard.<\/p>\n
The Air Guard’s personnel strength stood at over 90,300 by\u00a0the end of FY 1973 when active American military involvement in the Vietnam\u00a0War ended.<\/p>\n
The Vietnam War illustrated a central paradox facing the USAF’s reserve components. In January 1968, President Johnson mobilized naval and air reservists following the North Korean seizure of the USS Pueblo. More reservists were called into federal service following the February 1968 Tet offensive in Vietnam. Altogether, approximately 10,600 Air Guardsmen were called into federal service in 1968. Although most of the reservists were used to strengthen America’s depleted strategic reserve force, four ANG fighter squadrons were dispatched to Vietnam.<\/p>\n
On 3 May, F-100s from the 120th Tactical Fighter Squadron (Colorado) arrived at Phan Rang Air Base. By 1 June, all of the 120th’s pilots were flying combat missions.<\/p>\n
In the meantime, the 174th (Iowa), 188th (New Mexico), and the 136th (New York) had all deployed to Vietnam with their F-100s. In addition, 85 percent of the 355th Tactical Fighter Squadron — on paper a regular Air Force unit — were Air Guardsmen. They performed superbly according to Gen George S. Brown, the Air Force Commander in Vietnam. But, two ANG units deployed to South Korea in 1968 — the 166th (Ohio) and the 127th (Kansas) — had a spotty record.<\/p>\n
Their own support organizations had been stripped from them in the U.S. and there was no logistical structure in place to support their F-100s when they arrived in South Korea. The wing’s readiness rate fell below Air Force minimum’s in December 1968. The wing lost four aircraft and had one pilot killed in early 1969. It also failed an operational readiness inspection (ORI).<\/p>\n
In the meantime, the Air Force had\u00a0belatedly rediscovered that the F-100C was poorly-suited to its announced\u00a0air defense mission. The 354th’s mission was then shifted to supporting\u00a0the ground forces in Korea. Once the Pueblo’s crew was returned, the Air\u00a0Guardsmen prepared to return home from Korea. The unit passed an ORI and\u00a0both of its fighter squadrons were rated combat-ready. They returned to\u00a0the United States and left federal service in May and June of 1969.<\/p>\n
The\u00a0123rd TRW also experienced a rocky tour of active duty. The wing had not\u00a0been rated combat-ready when mobilized on 26 January 1968 primarily due\u00a0to equipment shortages. It was not part of Secretary McNamara’s selected\u00a0reserve force. The unit was given an unsatisfactory ORI rating in October\u00a01968. Despite those problems, the 123rd made a significant contribution\u00a0to active force operations. It began functioning as the primary Air Force\u00a0tactical reconnaissance unit in the continental U.S.<\/p>\n
Elements of its squadrons\u00a0rotated temporary duty assignments in Japan and Korea from July 1968 until\u00a0April 1969 providing photo reconnaissance support to American forces in\u00a0those areas. The wing’s units were returned to state status between December\u00a01968 and June 1969.<\/p>\n
Vietnam revealed a negative aspect of relying on reservists.\u00a0For largely domestic political reasons, President Johnson chose not to\u00a0mobilize most of the nation’s reserve forces. The 1968 callups were only\u00a0token affairs. Johnson’s decision to avoid a major reserve mobilization\u00a0was opposed by the senior leadership of both the active duty military establishment\u00a0and the reserve forces, but to no avail. The Reserves and the Guard acquired\u00a0reputations as draft havens for relatively affluent young white men.<\/p>\n
Military\u00a0leaders questioned the wisdom of depending on reserve forces that might\u00a0not be available except in dire emergencies.<\/p>\n
Race had emerged as another\u00a0major issue with flowering of the American civil rights movement in the\u00a01950s and 1960s. For over a decade after the active duty military establishment\u00a0had begun to integrate its ranks during the Korean War, the National Guard<\/a> had remained an almost exclusively white organization. Discrimination varied, but ten states with large black populations and understaffed Guard units still had no black Guardsmen in their ranks as late as 1961.<\/p>\n Secretary of Defense McNamara had tried to encourage voluntary integration in the early 1960s, with little success. The NGB had disputed his legal authority to force integration while the Guard was under state control. It had also argued that integration would be political suicide for some governors and would hurt the military capabilities of their units. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibited the use of federal funds to support discriminatory activities, dramatically altered the attitude of the Defense Department toward racial discrimination in the National Guard. It gave federal officials the power to force integration regardless of who controlled the Guard in peacetime. But, real progress in effectively integrating the Guard did not come until the 1970s.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"